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THE MJ-12 DOCUMENTS:
AN ANALYTICAL REPORT
(PRE-PUBLICATION DRAFT)
(JULY 1990)

By William L. Moore
&
Jaime H. Shandera

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THE MJ-12 DOCUMENTS: AN ANALYTICAL REPORT

BY WILLIAM L. MOORE & JAIME H. SHANDERA

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The story of the so-called MJ-12 documents is not an easy one to tell. In order to do it proper justice, one must take into account a wide variety of often very bizarre occurrences and events experienced by the two authors of this report. Just exactly what these were and how they may or may not fit into the larger picture of this extraordinary situation is something which must wait for another day. This is the stuff that entire books are made from, and that process is already underway.

Another factor to be taken into account here is that the investigation into what is rapidly becoming "L'affaire MJ-12" is not yet complete. As any good journalist or writer knows, a premature rush to publish details of an incomplete case often works more against the ultimate objective than it does for it. As long as doors remain open and progress is being made, the best strategy (although not necessarily the easiest) is often to remain silent even in the face of extreme criticism. In such cases, it is necessary to keep in mind that the primary goal is the obtaining of information and not the silencing of the critics.

In any case, the purpose of this report is to present information on a rather narrow aspect of the MJ-12 controversy-- that of the physical characteristics of the documents themselves. At the same time, it is important to note that Stanton Friedman has prepared an adjunct report on his own research, conducted somewhat independently, into the content of the documents, the people allegedly involved with MJ-12, and the larger picture of where all of this might or might not fit into historical perspective. Friedman's research, conducted under a \$16,000 grant from the Fund for UFO Research, has been separately published by that organization. Copies of this 59 page report plus references and appendices are available for \$12.50 postpaid from the Fund for UFO Research, POBX 277, Mt. Rainier, MD 20712.

For those delving into this mystery for the first time, perhaps a brief summary is in order.

Over the past ten years, the team of Moore and Shandera, working closely with Stanton Friedman, has quietly but aggressively been pursuing contacts and developing sources of information centered around the role played by the U.S. intelligence community with respect to the subject of unidentified flying objects (UFOs). Moore is a professional author, researcher and journalist, Shandera is a television producer-director with strong background in television news, and Friedman is a professional scientist who spends a great deal of time studying and lecturing about UFOs. Their goal has been to determine the extent of and reasons for the

government's cover-up of information about this subject.

The documents covered by this report came to us in a variety of ways from a number of different sources over the space of an entire decade. The story behind each is told in its appropriate section. Beginning with the release of some of this material to the press in mid-1987, an intense controversy has raged over whether the documents are authentic, and what their impact may ultimately be on the entire field of UFO research. It is the intended purpose of this report to provide some sense of focus to what has up to now been a confused jumble of conflicting allegations, pronouncements and opinions on the subject by a variety of individuals who, while having no direct connection with us or our work, have seen fit to intrude upon the controversy for sundry and often self-serving reasons.

The great bulk of the information contained herein has never before been made available either to other researchers or to the public. It is expected that many who thought the MJ-12 affair had become a dead issue and that there was nothing of importance left to say on the matter will be forced to open their minds and take another look at it. That is as it should be. Others, perhaps, will be forced to scramble to explain why they rushed to premature conclusions; which, of course, is also as it should be. In either case, no one interested in this controversy will be left untouched by this report.

It should also be noted that this report has been prepared upon the assumption that most of its readers already have some background knowledge of the MJ-12 controversy. For those who do not, an extensive bibliography has been included.

Any proper discussion of the so-called MJ-12 documents must, of necessity, begin by placing the entire matter into proper context and perspective. The fact is that these documents do not stand alone, but rather represent only the final link (so far as is known) in a chain of apparently related documents and events dating at least as far back as late 1977.

THE ELLSWORTH DOCUMENT (DEC. 1977)

As far as can be determined, the chain seems to have begun at Ellsworth A.F.B. in South Dakota. Sometime in the late fall or early winter of that year, the so-called Ellsworth Document (hereinafter referred to as "ED" and reproduced as Appendix A of this report) was officially fabricated as part of a government counterintelligence/ disinformation operation. On January 28, 1978, a copy of this document was sent to the National Enquirer (tabloid) in Lantana, Florida, accompanied by an anonymous cover letter indicating that the event had "actually occurred", that it had been classified Top Secret by the Air Force, and that witnesses had been silenced.

The Enquirer, to its credit, immediately launched an

investigation in an effort to determine the accuracy of the information in the document, but lost interest in the story after they were unable to come up with anything to suggest that the "ED" was real, while uncovering a great deal to suggest it was not. For example, Capt. Larry Stokes, named in the document as the officer responsible for having upgraded the situation at L-9 to "Covered Wagon" status, turned out to have been hospitalized with a high fever from November 14-27, and thus was not even on active duty, as the "ED" claims, when the alleged incident occurred on November 16th. More than 20 other errors and discrepancies were found as well. (1)

Since there is little doubt that the "ED" is phoney, the only questions remaining are who created it, and why. The "who" part may never be known with any degree of certainty beyond the fact that it was clearly someone associated with either AFOSI Detachment 1302, the 44th Security Police Group, or one of three people from Washington, D.C. (possibly CIA) involved with a counterintelligence/ disinformation training exercise being conducted at Ellsworth AFB during late 1977 and early 1978.

While a number of people have suggested that the "someone" in question might well have been ex-AFOSI Special Agent Richard Doty, those making such suggestions have been unable to produce anything beyond mere circumstance to support their claim. The facts are these:

- Doty was indeed serving with the 44th Security Police Group at Ellsworth during the time the "ED" was fabricated and sent to the National Enquirer. In December, 1977, he was in his second year as Law Enforcement Flight Chief for that group, and had recently completed a three-week course in (air) traffic management and accident investigation.

- Doty has admitted to the authors that he was in fact "aware" of the National Enquirer operation, but claims that he was only "peripherally involved" with it and that he had nothing to do with fabricating the "ED". He has consistently refused to discuss the matter further because, he says, he is bound by his security oath.

- Through the cooperation of other sources, the authors have been able to learn that there were really two principal objectives behind the fabrication of the "ED":

- (A) Beginning in mid-1977, several stories appeared in the National Enquirer which led Air Force security people to believe that someone at Ellsworth was leaking small amounts of material to the tabloid about sensitive Air Force projects, none of which seems to have had anything to do with UFOs.

- (B) At about the time this situation came to their attention, some of the same A.F. security people whose responsibility it was to investigate such problems were

involved in the above-mentioned, possibly CIA sponsored training program which had to do with the formulation and use of disinformation as a counterintelligence tool. Such programs are often a double-edged sword in that while they offer training to a relatively large number of people, those sponsoring them often make a point of identifying specific individuals among those involved either directly or peripherally (i.e. as trainees, or perhaps as organizers and assistants), who might prove useful in future situations. It seems to have been through such a process that Richard Doty's name came to the attention of a shadowy figure in Washington who would later find ways to make considerable use of him. That man was "the Falcon".

In any case, someone responsible for setting up the curriculum of this training exercise hit upon the idea of getting two birds with one stone. They would create a document as an example of how such things were done, and then send a copy of it to the Enquirer along with an anonymous cover letter indicating its legitimacy. If, as suspected, sources at Ellsworth had indeed been in contact with the Enquirer, then it seemed reasonable to assume that those individuals would be among the first the Enquirer would try to make contact with in an effort to obtain more information about the "ED" and its contents. All that was needed was to monitor the activities of the Enquirer's people and of those individuals at Ellsworth suspected of being in contact with them. Those with whom the Enquirer made contact would immediately be questioned about the matter. And, since the target was, after all, the National Enquirer, what better topic around which to build a phoney document than UFOs? It was the one topic the Enquirer could be counted upon to take an immediate interest in. Whether the ruse was successful or not is uncertain, although there are indications that it was.

-The one piece of forensic evidence in this case which seems to have been completely overlooked up to now is the fact that whoever created the "ED" made the mistake of writing out the date and number at the top of it and the distribution list at the bottom in longhand. A careful comparison of this handwriting with several samples of Richard Doty's handwriting (both printing and cursive) collected by the authors over the years fails to yield even a single point in common. Based upon a more limited sample, there are also no points in common with the handwriting of Sgt. Richard A. Benson, the man the Enquirer's suspicions centered upon as possible perpetrator of the hoax. Find the person whose handwriting matches those notations, and you have the person who created the document.

-Another point to be made here is that during his

involvement with researcher/author Linda Howe in 1983 as part of the then on-going Bennewitz affair(2), Doty once mentioned the Ellsworth incident to her and suggested it had been a real event. Later on, according to Pratt, he admitted to her that it had not really occurred. Curiously, Moore got quite a different response when he asked Doty about it in late 1981. Doty, after asking Moore what he knew about the affair, readily stated that the event had never occurred. Security regulations, he said, forbade him from making any further comment about it except to say that what little truth there was in it had been loosely based upon an actual UFO sighting in the area which had been experienced by a local sheriff's deputy. The deputy's sighting, however, had definitely not involved a landing. Doty also averred at the time that he had not been the one who had created the document.

-Whoever did create the "ED" also made one other apparent error. Unfortunately, we must say "apparent" here since although the cover letter written to the Enquirer exists as an original document, the "ED" itself exists only as a photocopy and thus cannot be considered best evidence. Even so, a careful examination of both documents leads to the strong probability that both were typed on the same typewriter-- a fact that, if true, flies in the face of assertions by the anonymous writer of the cover letter to the effect that he served on "a special team of individuals" appointed by the Air Force "to investigate the incident", and that he "obtained a copy of the original report" only after it was classified on December 2, 1977; both of which seem intended to give the appearance that the "ED" itself was written by someone other than the writer of the cover letter.

Furthermore, a comparison of the typeface used on the "ED" and its accompanying cover letter with the typeface which consistently appears on the 44th Security Police Group's "Desk Blotter" during the time frame in question clearly shows that the "ED" and the "Blotter" were typed on two very different machines. This makes somewhat less tenable the Enquirer's 1978 hypothesis that a disgruntled Sgt. Benson "whiled away a whole shift dreaming this thing up"-- an hypothesis based mostly upon the then popular but since largely discredited technique of voice-stress analysis.

THE "WEITZEL" LETTER (JULY, 1980)

Chronologically speaking, the next item in the chain is the so-called Weitzel letter ("WL") which was sent anonymously to the now defunct Aerial Phenomena Research Organization (APRO) of Tucson, Arizona, in the latter part of July, 1980. While not

actually a document in the sense of the word as applied in this report, it is nonetheless important in that it is directly connected to AFOSI's efforts to obtain the assistance of a source within APRO in the early days of the Bennewitz affair. The letter is reproduced in its entirety as Appendix B.

Essentially, all that we know about the "WL" is covered in Moore's paper "UFOs and the U.S. Government, Part I" which he read at the Las Vegas MUFON Symposium on July 1, 1989. The appropriate paragraph is quoted as follows:

"The letter, which is loosely based upon an actual UFO case, was written anonymously to APRO in July, 1980 by Richard Doty and is directly related to the Bennewitz affair. Essentially it was "bait". AFOSI knew that Bennewitz had close ties with APRO at the time, and they were interested in recruiting someone within the APRO organization who would be in a position to provide them with feedback on Bennewitz' activities and communications. Since I was the APRO Board member in charge of Special Investigations in 1980, the Weitzel letter was passed to me for action shortly after it had been received. It was not long thereafter that I came to know Richard Doty and began providing him with information about the Bennewitz case."

Actually, the "WL" turned out to be nothing more than an exercise in futility since Moore's cooperation with AFOSI derived not from that letter, but rather from his meeting with the source codenamed "Falcon", who, in October of 1980, designated Richard Doty as middle-man in that relationship. Given the circumstances of this event, it seems reasonable to conclude that Doty had come to the attention of "Falcon" as a result of the Ellsworth training exercise on disinformation in 1977; thus making the choice of Doty as middle-man an entirely logical one. What the relationship between Doty and "Falcon" was during the intervening three years is anybody's guess. Since Doty steadfastly refuses to discuss the Ellsworth affair beyond those points already on record, we are left once again with either trying to make a case out of purely circumstantial evidence, or allowing the matter to remain unsolved.

With respect to forensic matters, a comparison of the typefaces on the "WL" with those which appear on the "ED" leaves no question that, as expected, different machines were used to create both documents. The typeface on the "WL", however, is to play a very important role in determining the question of Doty's credibility, as we shall see later in this report.

On the question of style and content, a comparison of the "ED" cover letter and the "WL" brings to light certain curious similarities which suggest that the creators of both had, at the very least, undergone similar indoctrination in the fabrication of this sort of disinformation. For example:

- Both letters employ the odd style of placing a semicolon rather than a colon or a comma after the salutation.
- Both allege that the incident involved actually occurred.
- Both indicate that the writer was in a position to have some first-hand personal knowledge of it.
- Both stress a need for anonymity due to the alleged "active duty" status of the writer.
- Both mention the existence of photographs which the writer is unable to provide.
- Both allude to an official cover-up.
- Both are loosely based upon actual UFO incidents which have been highly exaggerated and elaborated upon.
- Both use the term "individuals" in place of "people" or "persons".

In other words, based upon the above, a reasonably good case might be made for the hypothesis that the writers of both letters referred to the same set of guidelines in the creation of their work. (If there's one thing the military is well-known for, it's their penchant for sticking to the rules. Note also that the above "points in common" are essentially content and not stylistic similarities.)

The idea that both documents were written by the same person (possibly Richard Doty, as some have suggested) falls completely apart, however, upon careful examination of the numerous dissimilarities therein, all of which are stylistic in nature. For example:

- The "ED" letter employs military style for the writing of dates. In the "WL", the style is civilian.
- The "ED" letter uses the term "Air Force"; the "WL" uses "USAF".
- The writer of the "ED" has a much better grasp of spelling, grammar and sentence structure than is demonstrated in the "WL" Compare:

THE ELLSWORTH DOCUMENT & COVER LETTER

- Contain c.650 words (combined) of text.
- This text contains just 7 errors of usage, only 2 of which are spelling errors. (One of these is the word "nuclear", which is misspelled "necular"-- an unusual error for one presumably charged with guarding nuclear missile sites, and, thus, suggestive of a writer whose specialty lies in other areas. It is also suggestive of a writer other than Doty, who spells nuclear correctly in documents clearly attributable to him.)
- The writer demonstrates proper use of the possessive form.
- The writer employs and demonstrates proper use of parentheticals.
- The writer displays a consistent habit of

correcting himself through the use of overstrikes. (There are 7 of these visible in the text.)

THE WEITZEL LETTER

- Contains c.750 words of text; a sample sufficiently similar to the above to permit reasonable comparison.
- This text contains no less than 18 errors of usage, of which 8 are spelling errors.
- Improper use of the possessive form is demonstrated.
- No parentheticals are employed.
- The writer (Doty) displays a habit (visible in other documents attributable to him as well) of correcting typographical errors by writing over them in pen rather than overstriking with the typewriter.

The fact that two clearly distinct writers emerge from the above comparison is extremely important in two ways: First, it demonstrates that as early as mid-1980 there were at least two individuals involved in officially creating spurious material and providing it to public sources; and second, both can be traced to a common point, i.e. the training exercise in counterintelligence and disinformation conducted at Ellsworth A.F.B. in late 1977 by "men (pl.) from Washington (D.C.)."

THE "AQUARIUS DOCUMENT" (FEB. 1981)

The next link in the chain was the so-called Aquarius Document ("AD"), which is reproduced as Appendix C. Rather than spend time recounting the history of this item de novo, the material about it which is already on record is reprinted here as a starting point.

From FOCUS, June 30, 1989, page 13:

"(The "AD") is an actual example of some of the disinformation produced in connection with the Bennewitz case. The document is a retyped version of a real AFOSI message with a few spurious additions. It was apparently created by AFOSI, or at least I always assumed it was, and it was handed to me in February, 1981 (sic.) with the intention that I would pass it to Bennewitz. My understanding, although I never knew for sure, was that Bennewitz was expected to wave it to the press and others as proof of what he was saying about an alien invasion, at which point the document would be denounced as a counterfeit and Bennewitz would be further discredited. Unfortunately (or perhaps fortunately, depending upon one's point of view) it didn't turn out that way." (A highlighted version of this document showing the original text and the added disinformation

is also included in Appendix C.

"One additional bit of information about this document is the way in which it initially came to be known to the UFO community. In September of 1982, insofar as I was aware, there were only three copies of this document in existence. One of these I had passed to Bennewitz, a second was in safekeeping, and a third was in my briefcase during a trip I had made to San Francisco. While there, I had a morning meeting with a man who turned out later to be an associate of UFOlogist Peter Gersten of New York. That same afternoon, my car was broken into and my briefcase was stolen. Four months later, a copy of that same document complete with annotations I had pencilled on it, turned up in the hands of none other than Gersten himself. To this day, I have never received a satisfactory explanation of how he obtained that document."

And, from FOCUS, September 30, 1989, page 8 (interview with Moore):

"Q: With respect to the so-called "Aquarius Document" which purports to be a facsimile of an AFOSI teletype message dated 17 NOV 1980, several questions still remain:

- (A) Are you the one who retyped the document?
- (B) If not, do you know who did?
- (C) The fact that you have identified changes, additions and deletions allegedly made in the retyped version suggests that you either had access to or were familiar with the text of the original version. How do you explain this?
- (D) Did the text of the original really refer to "NSA" rather than "NASA"?

"A: First of all, it is important to take note of what I said in Las Vegas, which was that the document is a retyped version of a real AFOSI message with a few spurious additions. I also stated that it was apparently created by AFOSI, or at least I had always assumed it was, and that it was handed to me in February, 1981 with the intention that I would pass it to Bennewitz. I thought the "created by AFOSI" statement would have laid this matter to rest, but apparently not. Therefore:

First: I did not retype the document, nor do I know who did. Certainly it was someone involved with the Bennewitz C/I effort, maybe Doty, maybe not.

And Second: I know that the version I was handed was a retype because I had seen the original earlier on, or at least, what I believe to this day to have been an original since it was a teletype copy and not a xerox. The reconstructed version which appears in FOCUS (and herein as Appendix C) is the combined product of both my

and Rick Doty's memory. To the best of my (our) recollection, the original did indeed refer to NSA."

Even after the above material was released by Moore in 1989, questions about this particular document have persisted. Although most of these have resulted from misperceptions and misinterpretations of what Moore actually said, there does appear to be some need to set the record straight, and in some small cases, even to correct it. It is with that in mind, as well as the need to be as complete and specific as possible in this report, that the following facts are offered:

-First of all, the date of February, 1981 is incorrect (if only by a few days). In checking his records, Moore has determined that the correct date was March 2, 1981. At a meeting with "Falcon" on that date, Moore was shown the original "AD", which appeared to be a typical government telex on thin computer paper with perforated edges. After examining it, Moore asked if he could keep it. "Falcon" said no, that Moore was only being given the opportunity to read it; at which point Moore proceeded to re-read it while making a conscious effort to imprint as much of it as possible upon his memory in the process. Immediately following that meeting, he wrote out some notes on a legal pad. (For the record, Moore had already been told of the alleged existence of Project Aquarius during an earlier meeting with "Falcon" in December, 1980 and had filed a FOIA request on it with HQ/USAF dated 29 December, 1980. Their negative response dated 12 February, 1981 [sent from FTD at Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio] was already in hand at the time of the March 2nd meeting.)

-At a meeting with "Falcon" and Doty in Albuquerque several weeks later, Moore was handed the retyped version which appears herein as Appendix C. When Moore commented that this version of the "AD" was somewhat different than the one he had been shown earlier, and that someone had obviously made some significant changes and additions in the interim, he was informed that this had been necessary in order to "sanitize" it. "Falcon" then told Moore that he could have the copy in hand, and that perhaps Paul Bennewitz might be interested in one as well.

-Moore, realizing that the original had been retyped and altered for a purpose, resisted providing Bennewitz with a copy for several months, even though several times during that interval it was suggested that he do so. Finally, in June, 1981, Moore carefully marked a copy so that it could be readily identified, and provided it to Bennewitz. Unknown to either "Falcon" or Doty, however, Moore confided in Bennewitz that the document might be a

set-up, and advised him to use it only for his own purposes and not to go public with it. Bennewitz listened intently, put the document in his safe, and never did publicize it.

-Bennewitz' failure to make public use of the "AD" must have been very frustrating to those who had planned otherwise. As indicated above, the "AD" only became public knowledge after it fell into Mr. Gersten's hands. Whether the San Francisco break-in (which occurred on September 13, 1982 and was reported to SFPD) was engineered as a result of that frustration and the document passed to Gersten with the expectation that he would circulate it, remains unknown. Certainly the government had motives of its own in wanting to discredit Gersten, since at the time he was causing them considerable headaches with his continuing efforts to take the government to court on F.O.I.A. matters and his plans to make a federal case out of the Cash-Landrum incident. Gersten quietly began circulating the "AD" to a few members of the UFO community in early 1983, but since he never endorsed it as authentic, it couldn't be used against him.

-On March 12, 1983, the subject of the "AD" came up at a board meeting of the Fund for UFO Research, which Moore and Shandera attended as guests. Moore's statement that the document was a retyped and altered version of an original has since been misinterpreted by a number of people (who weren't there but only heard about it later through the grapevine), and is the origin of the rumor that Moore himself was responsible for retyping the document. Such rumors are nothing more than unfounded gossip.

-The Moore-Doty reconstruction of the original "AD" text (Appendix C) came as a result of Moore sitting down with the retyped version in late 1988 and, using his memory and notes taken in 1981, attempting to come as close to the original content as possible. Once Moore had done all he felt he could along those lines, he took the matter up with Doty, who was able to offer a few additional changes. The reconstructed version which appears herein is the result of that process, and is believed by both to be a very close approximation of the original. "Falcon" did not take part in this process.

Forensic evidence with respect to the "AD" is sparse, but important:

- The document contains c.350 words of text.
- This text contains a total of 10 errors of usage, of which 7 are spelling errors. (Four of these are misspellings of the same word, "depicting", which is spelled "deplicting".)

- The writer displays a habit of correcting typographical errors by writing over them in pen rather than overstriking with the typewriter. Four of these are evident.
- A small sample of handwriting appears in the upper right-hand corner in the form of two notations which read "B I D - 1" and "C C - 1".
- The typewriter involved uses a modified courier typeface typical of IBM and Olivetti electrics made during the 1970s and used by thousands of government offices. (The specific make and model of the machine is actually unimportant in this case, and thus we did not go to the trouble of identifying it further.)

Based upon the above, several conclusions can be drawn:

- (1) The high incidence of errors in the "AD" compares favorably with the similar high incidence found in the "WL", suggesting, but not conclusively proving that both were typed by the same person. Since the "WL" was created in mid-July, 1980, and the "AD" had to have been typed (for reasons we shall make clear later) between November 17, 1980 and March 2, 1981, it is also reasonable to suppose that the person's skills would not have changed much in that time. Both arguments, however, are admittedly speculative.
- (2) The habit of correcting typographical errors by overwriting them in pen is another point in common with the "WL", and once again suggests, but does not conclusively prove that the same person typed both. This habit is typical of Doty, and, as has been noted before, is visible in other items attributable to him.
- (3) A comparison of the handwritten notations on the "AD" with samples of Doty's handwriting (printing) reveals a distinct similarity between the two. Unfortunately the sample evident on the "AD" is too small to permit a positive match.
- (4) The modified courier typeface evident on the "AD" is the same as that which appears on the "WL", suggesting that the same machine was used to type both. Once again, this is impossible to prove conclusively because photocopies do not constitute best evidence, and because electric typewriters which have been properly maintained are almost impossible to distinguish from one another (assuming, of course, that they are of the same make and model). This notwithstanding, however, it is important to note that other documents attributable to Doty were typed on either the same or a similar machine. (See, for example, the section on the Kirtland documents which follows.)

In the final analysis, the question of who retyped the document is of considerably less importance than the information contained in it. If in fact Doty did retype it (as the evidence strongly suggests but does not prove), then he did so under orders and for a purpose. The fact that the retyped version is a close imitation of a real document (which Moore saw via "Falcon") and that much of its content is good information, far outweighs the question of who

might have typed it. Certainly Moore did not have access to that sort of information in 1981, and certainly, whether Doty typed it or not, it would have been professional suicide for him to have been involved in placing such an instrument in public hands without such action having been carefully planned and sanctioned by someone higher-up. So, what we are left with is, as Moore stated in Las Vegas in July 1989, "an actual example of... disinformation."

There seem to be a lot of misperceptions about disinformation amongst UFO researchers. Just the mention of the word in some circles is enough to cause people to run for cover. Yet what we have here in the "AD" is a prime example of the fact that pursuing the government's disinformation games can indeed lead to the uncovering of a considerable amount of useful, sometimes even revealing information which would have remained unknown had the documentation involved been simply disregarded as spurious or unreliable. Disinformation, by its very nature, is not all lies--it is simply intended to be a diversion from the truth. In order to be effective, it must, of necessity, contain a certain amount of good information so that it will stand up under scrutiny. Indeed, people involved with official disinformation schemes often comment that the most difficult part of the problem is the process of determining what and how much real information can safely be given away. Often, carefully planned and orchestrated disinformation schemes are abandoned at the last minute for no other reason than the fact that someone in a control position has decided that the "give away" factor is too great for the potential gain. Disinformation is not all bad; providing that one can learn enough about the process, AND be well enough versed in the subject matter involved to be able to make an educated guess at what's real and what isn't. Like swimming, the only way to truly learn the process is to experience it first-hand by getting in the water. That is precisely what Moore was trying to do when he got involved with the Bennewitz affair.

As indicated above, an analytical look at the "AD" goes a long way towards demonstrating the fact that official disinformation does indeed contain a certain measure of valid and often useful data. With that in mind, a careful breakdown of the "AD"'s content shows that the information therein falls into four distinct categories, "Good", "Bad", "Distorted" and "Gray", which are outlined below:

"Good Data"

-There are two dates given in the "AD": October 29, 1980, and November 17, 1980. October 29th is given as the date of a message from AFOSI Dist. 17 (Kirtland) to AFOSI/HQ (Bolling AFB, Washington, D.C.) requesting "photo imagery interpretation" of Bennewitz' films and photos. November 17th is the transmission date of the "AD" itself from OSI/HQ to District 17.

Both dates are the same as appeared in the original "AD" telex, and both are entirely consistent with events

taking place in the Bennewitz affair at the time in question. Bennewitz, for example, produced copies of his photos and films at a meeting with OSI officials (and others) on October 26th, and these were referred to for the first time in a known-to-be-authentic report to HQ dated October 28th. (See Appendix E-3.) This leaves room for copies having been transmitted to HQ under separate cover the following day as the "AD" indicates. Furthermore, according to another known-to-be-authentic OSI document (Appendix E-4) it was on November 17th that OSI notified Bennewitz that it was "not in a position to evaluate (his) information and photographs... or technically investigate such matters." This coincides both with the time of receipt indicated on the "AD" (11:30 zulu, which translates to 4:30 A.M. Albuquerque time), and with the directives provided in the final lines of the "AD" which voice concern about possible public disclosure and advise Dist. 17 to continue covertly collecting and transmitting data as before. (In this light, the acronym "SPA" is correctly used. It translates as "Special Purpose Access".)

Given these goings-on, plus the fact that the "AD" (original) fingered N.S.A. as the agency most interested in the Bennewitz affair, Doty's statement to Bennewitz on the afternoon of November 17th to the effect that "AFOSI would not become involved in the investigation of these objects..." and that "AFOSI was not in a position to evaluate... or technically investigate" was truth stretched to the finest line possible. What was left unsaid, of course, was that OSI would continue to collect data and pass it along to those who were in a position to "evaluate" and "technically investigate." This explains why OSI's files on the Bennewitz affair are woefully incomplete. It also suggests a motive for "Falcon" having showed Moore the "AD" in its original form-- that motive possibly having been to apprise Moore of the fact that interest in the Bennewitz affair in specific and the subject of UFOs in general went far deeper than it appeared on the surface; and to suggest to Moore something of the true nature and connections of the man he would come to refer to as the "Falcon".

Having dispensed with the dates and time-flow aspects of the "AD", there are several other bits of good information in it which require mention:

- The "Subject Case Number" given ("8017D93-126") is a correct number for the Paul Bennewitz file. Also used is the "zero file" designator "8017D93-0/29x". So-called zero files are essentially open data collection files maintained at the local OSI level.

- Reference to "HQ CR-44" is also correct. HQ CR-44 was a classified (mostly Secret) headquarters data

collection regulation having to do with documenting and investigating threats or potential threats to areas or structures used in the storage of nuclear materials or nuclear weapons components. (3) Both Coyote Canyon and Manzano base fall into this category (see following section on Kirtland documents); and aerial threats (one type of which would be UFO) are included in the CR.

HQ CR-44 was replaced by HQ CR-44a and its classification upgraded effective November 23, 1983.

-The 7602nd Air Intelligence Group, headquartered at Ft. Belvoir, Virginia, was one of the most secret groups in the Air Force in 1980, and was capable of arranging for photo interpretation. On Oct. 1, 1981, the unit underwent an organizational restructuring and is presently known as the Air Force Special Activities Center (AFSAC). It has an interesting background of covert intelligence and deception operations; and the people involved in it are just the sort of people who could easily infiltrate America's civilian UFO community and provide reports on its activities-- providing, of course, that someone at a command level felt that such an expenditure of manpower and resources was ultimately worth the trouble. (The unit's budget in 1983 was just over \$4 million, roughly 30% of which went to pay civilian personnel.)

Perhaps the most important thing about AFSAC, at least as far as this report is concerned, is its demonstrable connection with the subject of UFOs. During the 1960s, the unit which is now AFSAC was known as the 1127th Field Activities Group (still at Ft. Belvoir). According to documents obtained in response to a 1989 FOIA request, a "zero file" investigation was undertaken by both AFOSI and FBI in 1960 into a potential breach of security wherein it had been alleged that "Secret and Top Secret documents relating to UFOs were being surreptitiously removed from the Pentagon long enough to be reproduced." The resulting copies, it was alleged, were being provided to certain individuals connected with an early aerospace firm, who had shown some of them to friends, including, "on several occasions", Donald Keyhoe. The key portion of these documents is as follows:

"...files relating to the UFO are maintained principally in two places: at ATIC Headquarters, Wright-Patterson AFB, and at the 1127th Field Activity Group at Ft. Belvoir, Va." (4)

-The descriptions of Bennewitz' still photos and film footage in the "AD" is essentially correct once the spurious additions are removed as indicated in Appendix C. Note that in two of the five examples cited, the

conclusion was that a "legitimate... unidentified aerial object" had been captured on the film. Those who would equate "extraterrestrial device" with "unidentified aerial object" in the absence of further corroborating evidence however, would appear to be severely stretching the point.

-Both Jerry Miller and Robert Fugate did indeed provide assistance to AFOSI in the Bennewitz affair as stated in the "AD". Both have been interviewed, and neither has been willing to add anything significant to the public record with respect to their involvement. Of the two, Miller is by far the most interesting and does not hide his intense personal interest in the UFO topic.

"Bad Data"

-As far as can be determined, there has never been a "Capt. Grace" connected with the 7602nd AINTELG. In addition, the acronym "INSR" pertains to an office connected to the Air Force Intelligence Service Directorate of Security and Communications Management, which, although also located at Ft. Belvoir, had little to do with the 7602nd. Two similar acronyms, "IN" and "INX", however, were used by the 7602nd. Such is the nature of disinformation.

-There is no such thing as the "Bolton/Reinfeld Method" of photo analysis. This is complete fabrication.

-The mention of a "trilateral insignia" is spurious. Those who would attempt to connect this with the highly controversial Trilateral Commission are grasping at straws.

-Mention of the U.S. Coast & Geological Survey in Rockville, Maryland, as a "drop point" for UFO intelligence data is also spurious. Indeed, USCGS did not even exist in 1980, having been already incorporated into NOAA (National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration) some years before. Curiously enough, however, NOAA did operate a "Special Projects Office" in Rockville through at least mid-1983. Efforts to learn the specific purpose of its mission have not been successful.

"Distorted Data"

-Aside from 7602 AINTELG/INSR indicated above, there are a number of acronyms throughout the "AD" which are either juxtaposed, irrelevant to the office mentioned, or just plain spurious. The following is a partial list:

"AFOSI/IVOE" should read "AFOSI/IVOS"
"IVOE" is a different office.
"WINTEL" should read "WNINTEL"
"FSA" is spurious.
"NASA" should read "NSA"
"IT" is spurious.
"INS" following either "NASA" or "NSA"
is incorrect. See above for correct
application of this acronym.

"Gray Data"

Gray data is defined as information which is either so highly classified or so well hidden that it is only partially verifiable to those without "need-to-know" access. It is just this sort of information which rests at the very crux of the disinformation process; and it is the need to maintain the sanctity of such data which often more than justifies the bizarre convoluted efforts and the seemingly inordinate expenditure of manpower and resources necessary to protect it with what Winston Churchill so aptly described as a "bodyguard of lies."

Disinformation is as much an art as it is a science. Those few individuals who are truly good at it are highly prized by America's counterintelligence community. And sometimes, as is perhaps the case with whatever our government knows about UFOs, the many threads and strands of the disinformation web ("die spinne") are so widespread and attached to so many obscure points along the way, that only a selected few actually know the truth that lies in the center of it. For the rest, it's boxes within boxes within still more boxes.

Thus it appears to be with the "AD", at the heart of which lie two verifiably real but incredibly well concealed projects known as "Aquarius" and "MJ-Twelve", both of which came to be known to UFO researchers for the first time through this fascinating example of official disinformation. Whether both, or either, has anything to do with UFOs remains almost as much a mystery today as it did ten years ago when Moore's first encounters with the "Falcon" all began. Clearly someone is going to a lot of trouble to hide something... but what? Gray data is always confusing.

At this stage of our report, it seems appropriate to set forth the few facts we have been able to uncover about the real Project(s) Aquarius.

Efforts to verify the existence of Project Aquarius became confused early on by the fact that there seems to

be more than one of them, and that virtually all the particulars remain well hidden behind thick walls of national security.

The first independent confirmation that such a project existed came through our source "Seagull" who checked the matter through Department of Defense (DOD) channels shortly after Moore was shown the original of the "AD" telex in 1981. For sake of clarity, we shall refer to this as "Aquarius/A" information. In October, 1982, Moore wrote up a memorandum-to-file summarizing the data "Seagull" had been able to provide plus what had been gained through other means up to that time. The essence of that memorandum is as follows:

"Project AQUARIUS data obtained by "S" through sources within DOD. Project exists. Data took a long time to get because people contacted by "S" took quite a bit of time to find it. Very high security. "S" was directed to and spoke with one individual in Pentagon who has a copy of a summary report. This refers to a (more) lengthy Project Report in several volumes and also to a location which is a real location. Project exists within "Control Channel Baker" (i.e. "Black Project", ed.) and is "above Top Secret". Data requires clearances far beyond those possessed by "S" to gain access.

"Project comes at least partly under NISC (Naval Intelligence Support Center) at Suitland Blvd. location (in Maryland, just outside D.C.). NISC has to do with digital analysis and interpretation of photographs. Project interface with NISC utilized a room full of equipment (digital imagery). Reason for classification is not because of equipment, but because of type of work being done with it. Project facility was completed in 1976. Involved is a "type of information channel which is not yet in existence but might be established in the near future." There is no declassification date on the Project, and those involved with it will deny its existence to anyone not authorized to know about it. Facility involved is DIPS (Digital Image Processing System), Suitland Rd. Also called DIP System.

"Aquarius Project summary report is Document No. B55207/76. "S" was told by DOD contact: "If you've got the clearance, you can see it."

"Office symbol of DOD Pentagon connection for Project is DC5C. This is the Imagery Division of the Exploitation Management Branch which comes under purview of Assistant Vice Director for Collection Management."

Confirmation of the existence of what may be either a second "Project Aquarius" or possibly another arm of the

first, came in late 1985 when the National Security Agency (NSA), in response to a FOIA request, acknowledged that they had identified records of such a project, and that they were "exempt from disclosure" for reasons of national security. Follow-up correspondence, however, produced an official denial that their project had anything to do with "unidentified aerial objects." For purposes of this report, the NSA project will be referred to as "Aquarius/B". Virtually nothing else of significance is known about Aquarius/B since administrative appeals have failed to produce anything but more denials. For a time, NSA alluded to "an Air Force project by that name which dealt with UFOs", but later pronouncements from them dismissed this as a misunderstanding-- which it appears to have been.

Since NSA's primary mission lies in the area of signals and communications intelligence, and since there is a strong interface with all the components of DOD, it is possible that Aquarius/A and Aquarius/B are actually different branches of one and the same project. On the other side of that hypothesis, however, lies the fact that nowhere in "S" report is there any mention of NSA involvement.

The matter was further complicated when, during 1986, another confidential source, codenamed "Hawk", surfaced and revealed knowledge of a "Project Aquarius" which, he said, functioned as a lateral communications umbrella for a series of sub-projects having specifically to do with UFOs. Research into this material is not yet complete and will be published at some later date.

Still another "Project Aquarius" (this one we shall call "Aquarius/C") came to light in October, 1984 when DARPA (Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency) responded to a FOIA request by acknowledging that they had located records of a project by that name. The only thing they would say about it, however, was that it had not been a "UFO study". Everything else was exempt from disclosure due to national security considerations.

The mystery on this one remained unsolved until May of 1989, when a source from Minnesota made contact and provided the following:

"PROJECT AQUARIUS

"CONTRACT # N00014-69-C-0446

"ARPA ORDER # 1459

"AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE FEASIBILITY OF DEFENDING
SURFACE VESSELS AGAINST LOW-FLYING THREATS;

"THREAT EVALUATION; AIRCRAFT; TARGET RECOGNITION;
DOPPLER RADAR; DIRECTION FINDING; VELOCITY; AZIMUTH,

ANGLE OF ATTACK; RADAR TRANSMITTERS; RADAR RECEIVERS;
EARLY WARNING SYSTEMS; HIGH FREQUENCY COMPUTER
PROGRAMS; ALGORITHMS; NUMERICAL ANALYSIS; PATTERN
RECOGNITION; LOW ALTITUDE AERIAL TARGETS.

"TOP SECRET

"DECLASSIFICATION STATUS: OADR

"DISTRIBUTION CONTROLLED: CHIEF, OFFICE OF NAVAL
RESEARCH, CODE 414, ARLINGTON, VA 22217

"CONTRACTORS: (1) SYLVANIA ELECTRONIC SYSTEMS-WEST,
MOUNTAIN VIEW, CALIFORNIA, ELECTRONIC DEFENSE LABS.
(2) GTE SYLVANIA, INC. (3) RAYTHEON CO. BURLINGTON,
MASS. OHD ADVANCED DEVELOPMENT DEPT.

"REPORTS: MAR 70: QUARTERLY REPT. (#EDL-G900) 42p
 MAY 70: REPORT: MAY BELL TECHNICAL
 WORKSHOP 18-22 MAY 235p
 JUN 70: ANNUAL REPORT (#EDL-G915) 38p
 FEB 71: PROJECT AQUARIUS SPECIAL REPORT
 (#EDL-M1380) 38p
 MAY 71: FINAL REPORT (#EDL-E184) 117p"

This data was followed by a list of six names of
scientists who had been a part of the project.

(NOTES on the above before proceeding further:

- "ARPA" refers to the "Advanced Research Projects
Agency", predecessor of DARPA.
- "OADR" translates as "Originating Agency's
Determination Required.")

On May 24, 1989, Moore provided a copy of this
information to colleague Stanton Friedman who proceeded
to verify its accuracy through a telephone conversation
with the librarian at the Sylvania, Mountain View,
facility. There seems to be no question that the above
is good information (although according to the
librarian, its classification level is currently Secret
and not Top Secret). The problem here is whether
Aquarius/C is related in any way to Aquarius/A/B. Based
upon the following factors, we conclude not:

-According to the Contract number, this project
began in 1969. The date of its "Final Report" is May,
1971. This does not match what is known about
Aquarius/A, which we were able to verify as still
active in 1982 and again in 1987.

-None of the report numbers given for Aquarius/C
bears even a remote resemblance to the verified report
number we have for Aquarius/A.

-The presently "Secret" status of Aquarius/C does
not match the "Top Secret" status of Aquarius/A/B.

-The subject area of Aquarius/C ("Defending surface

vessels against low-flying threats") is different than the subject of Aquarius/A ("a type of information channel").

Granted that, if Aquarius/A/B are parts of some umbrella-type system, then Aquarius/C might well have been a part of that system at one time as well, but there is no evidence to elevate such a supposition beyond the level of sheer speculation. Certainly Aquarius exists. How, or if, it fits into the government's UFO puzzle remains unknown. We shall pick up again with more information on Aquarius in a later section.

With respect to the existence of a real MJ-12 project or group, there seems to be no question that a group utilizing that codename exists at a very high level within the infrastructure of the U.S. government. Although a small body of reliable data has been accumulated on this matter (one piece of which appears to link the group with the UFO subject), publication must be deferred until a later date because this investigation is not yet complete. It is appropriate to comment here, however, that virtually none of the sensationalistic, highly controversial and completely unsubstantiated rumors which have been published on the subject of MJ-12/ MAJII/ PI-40/ Pluto/ etc. by William Cooper, John Lear, William Hamilton, Timothy Beckley, John Grace et al. bears any resemblance to reality. Indeed, the paranoia, the extreme gullibility and the high public visibility of this crowd are just the sort of things which play right into the hands of those in the intelligence community whose responsibility it is to seek out likely candidates for the spreading of further disinformation and confusion.

THE FRIEDMAN-AFOSI MEMO (DEC. 1981)

In the summer of 1981, Stan Friedman began papering AFOSI headquarters in D.C. with FOIA requests about their involvement with the UFO phenomenon. After going the usual rounds and getting nowhere with Noah Lawrence, the OSI FOIA officer at the time, Stan asked if Moore could give him any advice on how to proceed. Moore advised Stan that, according to what he had been able to ascertain, information responsive to UFO data collection requirements then in effect was generally filed as "zero" items at District levels and that pertinent information was transmitted to HQ/OSI where it was forwarded to the agencies or offices which had requested that the data be collected. HQ/OSI, Moore indicated, only served as a hub for District-generated material, which, once received, was sent on to those who had arranged for its collection. In such a process, HQ/OSI acted only as a filter or cut-out. They were the hub of the wheel, and the District offices were the spokes which fed into it. Once information arrived at the hub, it was sent directly to the hub of a completely different wheel which, in its turn, distributed the material outward along its spokes to those persons and offices with need-to-know. In

that process, HQ/OSI's role was only to receive and retransmit. No file material need be retained by HQ in that process, and apparently very little was. That left only the "zero" files at District level, which, because they were not active "case" files, could be legally destroyed once they were more than 90 days old.

Moore's advice to Stan was to file requests with the various District offices and their individual detachments. Stan made the mistake of stating this intention to Noah Lawrence in a letter, and asking for an official listing of all OSI District and detachment offices. Lawrence, realizing that Stan had not only just revealed his hand but at the same time had pointed up the one weakness in an otherwise tight system of data collection and transmission, complied by sending Stan a list of all 133 District and detachment offices (field units). In doing so, however, Lawrence cleverly managed to stall Stan's request long enough to enable the potential hole in the system to be "fixed" by advising all field units that Stan might be making such requests, and that these were to be circumvented by advising Stan (or similar requestors) that requests for AFOSI files could only be processed through Lawrence himself at HQ/OSI. Lawrence, in essence, had deliberately created a "catch-22" situation: Since HQ/OSI's role was only to receive UFO information collected by its field units and forward it directly to other agencies, the only paper files of UFO-data within the OSI system existed in the form of "zero" files at field unit level. Thus, the initiation of a "special procedure" requiring field units to refer FOIA requestors directly back to headquarters without first searching their files (as required by AFR 12-30, AFOSI Supplement 1), effectively prevented the release of any information that might be in those files, while at the same time allowing HQ to truthfully state that they had searched their (headquarters) files and found nothing responsive.

Stanton's "tip-off" letter to Lawrence was dated November 4, 1981. It was in this letter that he first mentioned the possibility of filing separate requests with each of OSI's field units. Lawrence's response, dated November 17th, indicated two things: (1) That "any request for information received by AFOSI field units from the general public are (sic.) referred to this office for response;" and (2) It would cost Stan \$1,463.00 to initiate a search for "current" files which might be in field unit custody. While both statements had been carefully worded so as to appear to have face-credibility, both in fact were lies designed to discourage Friedman.

In the first instance, the part about requests to field units being referred to headquarters for response stands alone quite nicely as a true statement, while at the same time not being the whole truth. Lawrence was a master at such obfuscation, which, of course was why he held the job he did. What Lawrence's statement did NOT say was that, up to that point in time, FOIA requests submitted to field units were first acted upon by the unit's FOIA officer, who searched the local files and then submitted the letter of request and any local files found to be responsive to

it to headquarters, who then conducted a mandatory declassification review of the material and responded to the requestor with whatever portions of it could be released, if any. This, of course, resulted in at least the admission by OSI that file material did in fact exist, which is what Lawrence's catch-22 procedure was designed to circumvent. The last thing OSI wanted was to provide Friedman (a known participant in a then current FOIA lawsuit against NSA) with sufficient ammunition to take them into court too.

The part about the \$1463.00 was another form of obfuscation. Technically the figure was correct in that it was arrived at by multiplying 133 (the number of OSI field units) by \$11.00/hr (figuring an hour's search for each unit). 133 hours at \$11.00 comes to \$1463.00. However, what Lawrence neglected to tell Friedman was that normally no search fee was assessed in cases where the research time involved was one hour or less. Granted there were 133 "hours" involved here, but the fact was that each of them represented a search that would be undertaken by a different individual-- one at each field unit. Hence what the situation amounted to was 133 different searches of one hour or less undertaken by 133 different individuals at 133 different locations-- each one of which should have been subject to a waiver of fees. Clearly Lawrence's response was designed to discourage Friedman.

Friedman, however, wasn't to be discouraged so easily. When he responded to Lawrence's letter by formally requesting an official list of OSI field unit addresses, Lawrence immediately moved to cover himself by initiating his "special procedure" (reproduced as Appendix D), and then transferring the responsibility of responding to Friedman's request to R.M. Schellhammer, OSI Director of Plans, Programs & Resources. This effectively delayed the response for two weeks-- more than enough time to implement the "special procedure" (transmitted to all OSI field units on December 9th, 1981) and allow it to go into effect. Schellhammer mailed the list of OSI field offices to Friedman on December 14th.

At a meeting held in an Albuquerque restaurant on the evening of December 29, 1981, "Falcon" provided Moore with an original copy of the document which is reproduced here as Appendix D. Although there seemed little doubt that it was an authentic document, Moore, after careful consideration and consultation, quietly waited nine months and then filed a carefully worded FOIA with HQ/OSI requesting copies of all unclassified directives from HQ to field units dealing with the processing of FOIA requests at the field unit level. Moore's request covered "all such directives" generated over a one-year time period and made no mention of UFOs whatsoever. It was a typical "fishing expedition" letter, nothing more. There was nothing in its wording which might cause anyone who didn't already know to suspect that Moore already had a copy of one such directive in his possession. And it paid off. On September 24, 1982, OSI responded by providing a headquarters copy of the same message typed and signed by Lawrence on a DD form

Since there is no question of the document's authenticity, and since both its content and the above explanation of circumstances make its purpose absolutely clear, several firm conclusions can be drawn:

(1) Certain OSI headquarters personnel, including Noah Lawrence, knew that field units were actively collecting information on UFOs, and that the information thus collected was being passed through headquarters to other interested agencies and individuals. Lawrence knew that headquarters files were clean, should anyone come looking via FOIA, but he also knew that considerable material would be retained in field unit "zero" files and that, should this fact become public knowledge, it would cause considerable problems for OSI by placing the security of an entire covert operation in jeopardy.

(2) Stanton Friedman's obvious (at the time) connections with a well-publicized FOIA lawsuit against NSA (then under appeal to the Supreme Court) was sufficient reason to initiate precautions against him as the one person who had discovered the weak link in an otherwise tight system and was threatening to take advantage of it. (5)

(3) Since copies of this "special procedure" went to ALL OSI field units and not just District 17 (Kirtland AFB), we have proof here that OSI's interest in collecting data on UFOs was by no means limited to the Kirtland/Coyote Canyon events of summer, 1980 nor to the still active Bengewitz affair which involved only the Kirtland, Denver, and Headquarters detachments. Rather, it was a widespread, worldwide effort.

In addition to the above conclusions, there are a number of lessons in all of this to which UFO researchers should pay very close attention:

(A) Those who argue that the Freedom of Information Act is the best way to get sensitive information out of government agencies should note the ease with which OSI got around the law in the above situation. Obviously whoever was responsible for setting up the system was aware of FOIA's limitations and took them carefully into account.

(B) Those who believe that the completely open, above-board approach is the best way to conduct research should take note of the fact that it was Stanton's tipping of his intentions to Lawrence about contacting field units that was directly responsible for Lawrence's action to close the loopholes. Had Stan played a less obvious game, he might have had better results.

(C) The same situation applies to the filing of FOIA requests on sensitive subjects in general. FOIA officers, in general, work hand-in-hand with those responsible for maintaining security on classified operations. One of the best ways to determine if there has been a security leak is to carefully monitor FOIA requests.

Hypothetical situation: Source "A" leaks sensitive information to researcher "B" concerning classified project "C" being conducted by agency "D". B, in an effort to learn more about C, files a FOIA with D. If C is a super-sensitive, high-security

project, then B has just tipped D that there has been a security leak. The result? B gets a letter which either denies that such a project exists, or denies access to it on national security grounds; while D initiates an investigation aimed at identifying the source of the leak and putting a stop to it. In the end, B loses a good source of information and gains little or nothing in exchange. Meanwhile, A becomes an object lesson for those who might be thinking similar thoughts.

While the Freedom of Information Act can be a useful tool for the public and the press, few stop to think that it can also be a useful tool for the government as well.

The above is an excellent illustration of why the authors of this report have been so secretive in their investigations and so reluctant to share information with other researchers.

THE KIRTLAND DOCUMENTS (JAN. 1982)

The Kirtland documents consist of nine pages of material pertaining to the involvement of personnel from AFOSI District 17 in the investigation of a series of events which occurred in the Albuquerque area between August 13, 1980 and July 30, 1981. Although all nine pages of material do bear some relationship to one-another, it seems appropriate to break them down into three separate sub-sets for purposes of discussion. These are as follows:

(A) Complaint Form (AFOSI Form 1) dated 14 Aug 80; Title: Kirtland AFB, NM, 13 Aug 80, Possible Hostile Intelligence Intercept Incident, Frequency Jamming. (1 page). Copy reproduced herein as Appendix E-1.

(B) Complaint Form (AFOSI Form 1) dated 2-9 Sept 80; Title: Kirtland AFB, NM, 8 Aug - 3 Sep 80, Alleged Sightings of Unidentified Aerial Lights in Restricted Test Range. (3 pages). Copies reproduced herein as Appendix E-2.

(C) Multipurpose Internal OSI Forms (AFOSI Form 96) dated 28 Oct 80 (2 pages) & 26 Nov 80 (2 pages); and AFOSI Communication Form (AFOSI Form 158) dated 30 July 1981 (1 page). All of these pertain to AFOSI's continuing interest in the Paul Bennewitz affair, and are reproduced herein as Appendices E-3, E-4 and E-5.

To facilitate matters, further references to the above documents will be by Appendix number.

Much has already been written concerning the specific events mentioned in these documents. Since the scope of this report is limited to presenting material relevant to the authenticity of these items and the role they played in the chain of events leading to the MJ-12 briefing documents, it seems unnecessary at this point to digress in order to repeat material already in print. With that in mind, readers wishing to learn more about the UFO landing in Coyote Canyon and the Paul Bennewitz affair are urged to obtain and read the following:

-For the Coyote Canyon UFO incident:

*Maccabee, Bruce: "UFO Landings Near Kirtland AFB, or